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Abstract
Objective To investigate whether the incentive scheme for UK general
practitioners led them to neglect activities not included in the scheme.
Design Longitudinal analysis of achievement rates for 42 activities (23
included in incentive scheme, 19 not included) selected from 428
identified indicators of quality of care.
Setting 148 general practices in England (653 500 patients).
Main outcome measures Achievement rates projected from trends in
the pre-incentive period (2000-1 to 2002-3) and actual rates in the first
three years of the scheme (2004-5 to 2006-7).
Results Achievement rates improved for most indicators in the
pre-incentive period. There were significant increases in the rate of
improvement in the first year of the incentive scheme (2004-5) for 22 of
the 23 incentivised indicators. Achievement for these indicators reached
a plateau after 2004-5, but quality of care in 2006-7 remained higher
than that predicted by pre-incentive trends for 14 incentivised indicators.
There was no overall effect on the rate of improvement for
non-incentivised indicators in the first year of the scheme, but by 2006-7
achievement rates were significantly below those predicted by
pre-incentive trends.
Conclusions There were substantial improvements in quality for all
indicators between 2001 and 2007. Improvements associated with
financial incentives seem to have been achieved at the expense of small
detrimental effects on aspects of care that were not incentivised.
Introduction
Overthepasttwodecadesfundersandpolicymakersworldwide
have experimented with initiatives to change physicians’
behaviour and improve the quality and efficiency of medical
care.
1Successhasbeenmixed,andattentionhasrecentlyturned
to payment mechanism reform, in particular offering direct
financial incentives to providers for delivering high quality
care.
2 In 2004 in the UK the Quality and Outcomes Framework
(QOF) was introduced—a mechanism intended to improve
quality by linking up to 25% of general practitioners’ income
to achievement of publicly reported quality targets for several
chronic conditions.
3
Should these incentives succeed, the potential benefits for
patientswiththerelevantconditionsareconsiderable.
4Incentives
might also improve general organisation of care, benefiting
processes and conditions beyond those covered by the
incentives.
5 Financial incentives have several potential
unintended consequences, however. For example, they might
resultindiminishedproviderprofessionalism,neglectofpatients
for whom quality targets are perceived to be more difficult to
achieve, and widening of health inequalities.
6 7 Doctors might
also focus on the conditions linked to incentives and neglect
other conditions
8 or, where certain activities are incentivised
within the management of a particular condition, might neglect
other activities for patients with that condition.
Practices in England generally performed well on incentivised
activities in the first year of the UK incentive scheme, and
overall performance improved over the next two years.
9-11 It is
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Research
RESEARCHnot known, however, how much of this improvement is
attributabletotheincentiveschemeandhowmuchtounderlying
trends in quality improvement. There is also little evidence on
the impact of the incentives on activities lying outside the
incentive scheme.
Investigating these issues is problematic because performance
data were not routinely collected before the scheme’s
implementation, and afterwards data were collected only at the
practicelevelforactivitiesincludedintheframework.Evidence
from small patient groups suggests that achievement of
incentivised activities did accelerate on the introduction of the
scheme, with some positive spillover to non-incentivised
activities for incentivised conditions in the first year
12 but not
for non-incentivised conditions.
13
Theaimofourstudyistousealongitudinaldatasetatthepatient
level to examine changes in performance after the introduction
of the incentive scheme for processes that became part of the
incentiveschemeandforprocessesthatdidnot,andtocompare
the two groups.
Methods
The incentive scheme
The Quality and Outcomes Framework, introduced in 2004,
links up to 25% of UK family practitioner income to
performance on 76 clinical quality indicators and 70 indicators
relating to organisation of care and patient experience.
3 Of the
clinical indicators, 10 relate to maintaining disease registers,
56 to processes of care (such as measuring disease parameters
and giving treatments), and 10 to intermediate outcomes (such
as controlling blood pressure). Indicators are periodically
reviewed, and can be adjusted or dropped from the scheme
altogether, with new indicators being introduced. Physicians
are permitted to use their clinical judgment to exclude
inappropriatepatientsfromachievementcalculations(“exception
report”). Practices are awarded points based on the proportion
of patients for whom targets are achieved, between a lower
achievement threshold of 40% for most indicators (that is,
practices must achieve the targets for over 40% of patients to
receiveanypoints)andanupperthresholdthatvariesaccording
to the indicator. In 2007 each point earned the practice £125
(€141; $202), adjusted for patient population size and disease
prevalence.Amaximumof1000pointswasavailable,equating
to £31 000 per physician.
Data
Patient level data were extracted from the General Practice
ResearchDatabase(GPRD),whichcontainsanonymised,patient
based data on morbidity, prescribing, treatment, and referral
collected from over 500 general practices, covering about 7%
of the UK population (4.4 million patients).
14 Data are in Read
code format—a hierarchical system used to code clinical data.
Additional data on prescriptions and test results are available
as free-text entries. We selected a sample of 148 practices that
provideddatatotheGPRDcontinuouslybetweenJanuary2000
andDecember2007,structuredtoincludearangeoflist(patient
panel) sizes. Selected practices were nationally representative
in terms of patient sex and age distribution and area
socioeconomic deprivation but had a relatively large average
list size, reflecting a bias towards larger practices in the GPRD
(table 1). Overall, the selected practices performed marginally
better than national practices on the clinical indicators in the
QualityandOutcomesFramework(table1).Arandomselection
of 4500 patients registered for at least one day between 1
January 2000 and 31 December 2007 was drawn from each
practice.Forpracticeswithfewerthan4501patients,allpatients
were selected. The final sample consisted of 653 500 patients.
Patients with relevant conditions were identified from their
diagnostic Read codes (see appendix on bmj.com). Patients for
whom targets were met were identified from the relevant Read
codes and free-text terms.
Construction of indicators
TD, SC, JMV, CS, and MR initially identified 428 quality of
care indicators—combinations of processes of care and patient
groups—from published indicators of quality of care that had
been developed by a recognised method or which had broad
professional consensus (for example, derived from the British
National Formulary, published national guidelines, or
authoritative statements from specialist societies).
15-26
Indicators were rejected if the activity did not fall under the
remit of all general practices or if data to assess performance
were not available in practices’ electronic patient records. In
order to exclude, as far as possible, the effects on indicator
achievement of factors other than inclusion in the incentive
scheme,wealsorejectedindicatorsforwhichtherewas,during
the period of observation, a substantial change in the evidence
base, in coding procedures, or in availability of data from
electroniclaboratoryreports.Ouranalysismeasuredtheeffects
of incentives over both the short term (one year) and longer
term(threeyears),andwethereforealsorejectedindicatorsthat
were incorporated into, or dropped from, the incentive scheme
after the first year. Examples of rejected indicators are given in
the appendix.
After this process, 42 indicators were selected for the study.
The selected indicators were divided into two categories,
incentivised indicators (that is, those included in the Quality
and Outcomes Framework, where the particular process was
incentivisedfortheparticularpatientgroup)ornon-incentivised
indicators (that is, those not included in the Quality and
Outcomes Framework). Using an a priori schema, we further
classified the indicators into two types of clinical
activity—measurement (such as monitoring blood pressure) or
prescribing (such prescribing β blockers). Research has shown
thatpracticesapproachthesetypesofactivitiesdifferentlyunder
the incentive scheme: for example, rates of exception reporting
(identifying patients as unsuitable for a clinical indicator)
averaged 3% for measurement activities and 13% for treatment
or prescribing activities in 2005-6.
27 The levels of achievement
that are practically attainable also differ between the activity
types, with achievement rates generally lower for prescribing
compared with measurement activities. We therefore analysed
indicators of the two activity types separately. Indicators of a
third activity type—intermediate outcomes—were excluded as
no examples of non-incentivised outcome indicators could be
identified.
The four combinations of indicator category and activity type
(that is, incentivised measurement, incentivised prescribing,
non-incentivised measurement, and non-incentivised
prescribing)weredesignated“indicatorgroups”forouranalysis.
Table 2 describes the individual quality indicators.
Analysis
We divided the study period into financial years (1 April to 31
March)tocorrespondtotheassessmentperiodsforthefinancial
incentives. We designated 2000-1, 2001-2, and 2002-3 as
pre-intervention time points; 2003-4 as a preparatory phase
(when details of the forthcoming quality targets were in the
public domain but incentives were not yet available); and
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RESEARCH2004-5, 2005-6, and 2006-7 as post-intervention time points.
Patients were included in the sample for a year provided they
were registered with their practice for the entire year. All
availableeventswerethenexamined,andpatientswithrelevant
diagnostic or activity codes were included in the denominator
(Di) for a given quality indicator. From these patients, those for
whom the indicator was met within the required time frame
wereincludedinthenumerator(Ni).Weexcludedpatientsfrom
non-incentivised indicators where the activity was incentivised
foraco-existingcondition—forexample,patientswithcoronary
heart disease were excluded from indicator C8 (cholesterol
measurementforpatientswithhypertension).Foreachpractice,
annual achievement rates on each indicator were calculated as
Ni/Di. We applied logit transformations to achievement rates to
reduce floor and ceiling effects.
28
Weanalysedandcomparedindicatorgroupswithrespecttothe
differencebetweenachievementpredictedfromthetrendinthe
pre-incentiveperiod(2000-1to2002-3)andactualachievement
in both 2004-5 (the first year of the incentive scheme) and
2006-7 (the third year). Data were analysed as a two level,
mixed, multivariate regression with indicator crossed with
practice. Covariates included predicted achievement rates and
control variables for differences in disease registers (indicator
denominators, patient age, and patient sex). We derived
estimatesofmeansandstandarderrorsforeachindicatorgroup,
first controlling for differences in covariates across time points
and practices within indicators (model 1), then adding control
for differences between indicators (model 2). Full details of
each model appear in the appendix on bmj.com. We first
examined the impact of the incentive scheme on each of our
four indicator groups separately, and then used post-estimation
tests to compare between incentivised and non-incentivised
indicators for each of the two activity types. We also analysed
individual indicators. All statistical comparisons were made at
anαlevelof5%.AnalyseswereperformedusingStata(version
11). For presentation purposes, we report means back
transformed from the logit scale to percentages.
Results
Baseline performance before the introduction
of the financial incentives
Overthepre-interventionperiod(2000-1to2002-3)achievement
increased significantly for 32 of the 42 indicators, decreased
significantly for two, and did not change for eight. In 2002-3
achievement varied from 1.4% for indicator C3 (women aged
>50 with depression who have had thyroid function tests) to
98.7% for indicator D7 (patients treated with sumatriptan who
do not have angina) (see table 3 for full list). There were
systematic differences between indicator groups for the rate of
improvement (P<0.001), with incentivised measurement
indicators (that is, measurement indicators that became
incentivised in 2004-5) having the fastest overall rate of
improvement, and non-incentivised prescribing indicators the
slowest overall rate (figure). At the end of the pre-incentive
period (2002-3) indicator groups also differed in mean
performance scores (p<0.001), with the highest overall score
for non-incentivised prescribing indicators and lowest for
non-incentivised measurement indicators.
Achievement rates in the first year of the
financial incentives
In 2004-5, achievement rates for incentivised indicators were
significantly higher than rates projected from pre-incentive
trends for all 17 measurement indicators, and five of the six
prescribing indicators (table 3). The increase in achievement
abovethatpredictedfrompre-incentivetrendsvariedfrom1.2%
to37.7%,withfourindicators(allrelatingtomeasuringsmoking
status) having increases of over 30%. Both groups of
incentivisedindicatorsshowedoverallincreasesinachievement
significantly above the predicted rates (table 4).
For the non-incentivised indicators, there were significant
increases in achievement above the predicted rates for two of
the nine measurement indicators, and a significant decrease for
one (that is, achievement was below that predicted from
pre-incentive trends). There was no significant overall effect
for this group of indicators. Two of the 10 non-incentivised
prescribingindicatorshadasignificantincreaseabovepredicted
achievement rates, three had significant decreases, and there
was no effect for the remaining five. Overall, there was no
significant effect for this group of indicators (table 4). There
was, however, substantial heterogeneity of effect within this
group of indicators.
For both types of activity—measurement and
prescribing—increases in achievement above predicted rates
were significantly larger for incentivised indicators than
non-incentivised indicators under both model 1 and model 2
(table 4).
Achievement rates in the second and third
years of the financial incentives
There were significant increases in achievement rates for all
four indicator groups between 2004-5 (the first intervention
year) and 2006-7 (the third intervention year). With the
exception of non-incentivised measurement indicators, these
increases, although significant, were small (<3%, see table 4).
For the incentivised indicators, achievement remained
significantly above projected rates in 2006-7 for 10 of the 17
measurement indicators, and four of the six prescribing
indicators (table 3). However, rates were significantly below
projectionsforfivemeasurementindicatorsandoneprescribing
indicator. Even so, both incentivised groups continued to have
overall achievement rates significantly higher than predicted.
For the non-incentivised indicators, achievement was
significantlyaboveprojectedratesin2006-7foroneofthenine
measurement indicators, but significantly below for seven. The
overall achievement rate for this group was significantly lower
than predicted (by 5.6%). Four of the 10 prescribing indicators
had achievement rates significantly lower than predicted, and
one had a significantly higher rate. The overall achievement
rate for this group of indicators was also significantly lower
than predicted (table 4), although heterogeneity of effect was
high.
Relativetopredictedvalues,overallachievementratesin2006-7
for non-incentivised indicators were significantly below those
forincentivisedindicators,forbothmeasurementandprescribing
activities (table 4).
Discussion
Thesuccessofqualityimprovementinitiativesdependsnotonly
on whether they achieve their intended outcomes, but on their
unintendedconsequences.With“payforperformance”schemes
there is a risk that rewarding performance of certain clinical
activitieswilldivertattentionfromother,unrewardedactivities.
The original UK Quality and Outcomes Framework was
developed with a wide range of indicators, 76 clinical and 70
non-clinical, in part to prevent doctors focusing on too narrow
a range of activities and to encourage a broader systematic
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RESEARCHapproach to improving quality of care, although quality
improvement initiatives implemented in response to the
incentives tended to focus specifically on the incentivised
conditions and activities.
29 We used patient-level data from
general practices using electronic patient records from 1999
onwards to examine trends in achievement for incentivised and
non-incentivised activities.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Our study is subject to limitations. First, any changes in the
consistency and accuracy of data recording over time would
affectourfindings,particularlyforincentivisedindicators.Such
changesaremorelikelytoaffectindicatorsassessedbypractices
(such as body mass index) than indicators assessed by third
parties such as laboratories (for example, serum creatinine
concentration). However, we found no consistent relation
between changes in achievement rates over time and the agent
responsible for measuring indicator parameters.
Second, changes in case mix over time might have affected
achievement rates, particularly if there were changes in case
findingactivityundertheincentivescheme.Toaccountforthis,
we controlled for changes over time in indicator denominators
and age and sex profiles. We also found no substantial
differences in patterns of achievement for different cohorts of
patients(suchasdiabeticpatientsdiagnosedin2000-1compared
with patients diagnosed in later years).
Third, although the sampled practices were nationally
representative in terms of patient demographics, they might
have been atypical in terms of organisation and quality of care.
Collectively, they had marginally higher achievement scores
on incentivised indicators than the national average in each
intervention year,
30 which might be attributable to higher
baseline performance in the pre-incentive period or a greater
responsetotheincentives.However,withrespecttotheirgeneral
pattern of achievement for the incentivised indicators—high in
the first year followed by diminishing improvements in the
second and third years—the sampled practices followed the
national trend.
8
Fourth, we were highly conservative in selecting indicators,
focusing on processes not subject to other forms of incentive
and for which guidelines remained unchanged throughout the
study period. This limits the generalisability of our findings,
although comparison with trends in achievement rates for
non-selected incentivised indicators suggests that the selected
indicators were not atypical.
Inadditiontoexaminingtrendsinachievementforincentivised
and non-incentivised aspects of care, we made direct
comparisons between these. To strengthen this comparison we
groupedindicators,apriori,byactivitytype.Wealsocontrolled
for different baseline achievement rates and trends, and for
changes in disease registers over time. Nevertheless, the
subgroupsremainednon-equivalentinimportantrespects,both
in terms of patient groups and care processes. For example, in
contrast to other subgroups, most non-incentivised prescribing
indicators related to “negative” (patient safety) activities, and
the general focus of the incentives on promoting recommended
processes of care rather than on avoiding proscribed activities
mayhavedivertedattentionfrompatientsafetyissues.Activities
thatwereincorporatedintotheincentiveschememayalsohave
been accorded greater importance by clinicians even before the
scheme was implemented.
Non-equivalence does not invalidate our findings on the effect
oftheincentivesonincentivisedandnon-incentivisedindicators,
but it raises the question of whether such non-equivalence can
account for the observed post-intervention differences between
the groups. To investigate further, we used data from the first
two pre-intervention years to predict rates of achievement in
the last pre-intervention year (2002-3) and found only small
deviations from expectation for all four indicator groups. This
implies that uncontrolled sources of non-equivalence did not
produce group differences in the immediate pre-intervention
period, and that the post-intervention differences we observed
developedafterthatpoint(seeappendixonbmj.com).However,
as the financial incentives were introduced simultaneously
nationwide, with no control practices, we could not test our
assumption that in the absence of the incentives the
pre-intervention achievement trends would have continued.
The effect of the incentives
Of the 23 incentivised indicators we analysed, measurement
indicators improved at the fastest rate in the pre-intervention
period, from a relatively low baseline in 2000-1. After the
introduction of incentives, achievement rates increased
substantially for all measurement indicators, with increases
above projected rates in 2004-5 of up to 38%. Of the six
indicators with the greatest increases, five entailed recording
smoking status—a technically straightforward activity that had
a low baseline (either because practices were not asking most
oftheirpatientsbeforetheincentivesorwerenotrecordingthat
they were doing so), required minimal patient compliance, and
was monitored exclusively by the practices. Collectively,
prescribingactivitieshadhigherbaselineachievementratesthan
measurement activities in 2000-1, slower increases in
achievement rates in the pre-intervention period, and smaller
increases above projected rates in the first intervention year
(2004-5) of between 1.2% and 8.3%. Achievement rates for all
incentivisedindicatorsreachedaplateauinthesecondandthird
years of the scheme, and as a result only 14 of the 23
incentivised indicators had achievement rates significantly
higher than rates projected from pre-intervention trends after
three years.
For non-incentivised indicators the introduction of financial
incentives seemed to have little overall impact in the first year,
withqualitycontinuingtoimproveataroundthepre-intervention
rate. In the second and third years, although quality continued
to improve, the rate of improvement slowed. By 2006-7 quality
wassignificantlyworsethanprojectedfrompre-incentivetrends,
most notably for measurement activities, and was also
significantly below—relative to projection—the quality for
incentivised activities.
The general improvement in quality before the introduction of
the financial incentives suggests that the quality initiatives
implemented in the UK at that time—including clinical audits,
developmentofinformationtechnology,andcreationofquality
oriented statutory bodies—were having an effect in improving
quality of care. The Quality and Outcomes Framework built on
thisinfrastructureandintroducedanationalsetofqualitytargets
(clinical guidelines) supported by computer prompts and
feedback and backed by financial and reputational incentives.
The scheme was associated with additional increases in
performanceinitsfirstyearacrossabroadrangeofincentivised
activities,buttherateofimprovementwasnotsustained.There
are several possible explanations for this. Practices might have
improved their recording procedures in the first year of the
scheme in response to the incentives, effectively “correcting”
achievementrates,particularlyforsomemeasurementindicators.
After this, the rate of quality improvement seemed to plateau.
Alternatively, practices might have reached their achievement
limitby2006-7,withtheincentiveschemehasteningtheirarrival
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RESEARCHat this ceiling. A third explanation is that practices relaxed their
efforts after the first year of the scheme. Most practices attained
achievementratesabovethemaximumachievementthresholds
(the level of achievement required to secure maximum
remunerationunderthescheme)formostincentivisedindicators
in the first year, and thereafter had no financial incentive for
further improvement.
Conclusions and policy implications
Quality of primary care was generally improving in England in
theearly2000s.Theintroductionofanincentiveschemeseemed
to accelerate this trend for incentivised activities, but quality
quickly reached a plateau. Incentives had little apparent impact
onnon-incentivisedactivitiesintheshortterm,butseemtohave
hadsomedetrimentaleffectsinthelongerterm,possiblybecause
of practices focusing on patients for whom rewards applied.
SomeaspectsoftheUKQualityandOutcomesFrameworkand
its setting may have limited its impact on non-incentivised
activities(suchasthelackoffinancialpenalties,thewiderange
of indicators, and the existence of other quality initiatives) and
otheraspectsmayhaveexacerbateditsimpact(suchasthelarge
size of the incentives and the appearance of incentive related
prompts on clinical computing systems during consultations).
Findingsmaybedifferentunderschemeswithdifferentincentive
structures operating in different settings. Nevertheless, these
findingsshowsomeimportantlimitationsoffinancialincentive
schemes in health care, and the importance of monitoring, as
far as possible, activities that are not incentivised in addition to
those that are when determining the effects of such schemes.
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RESEARCHWhat is already known on this topic
Carefully constructed financial incentive schemes in healthcare can lead to improvements in quality of care for incentivised
activities
Concerns remain about the potential unintended consequences of financial incentives, in particular that they could lead
to neglect of non-incentivised aspects of patient care
What this study adds
We examined trends in quality of care for 42 activities (23 incentivised under the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework
incentive scheme, and 19 not incentivised) selected from 428 identified quality of care indicators
Quality of care initially improved for incentivised activities but quickly reached a plateau. Incentives had little impact on
non-incentivised activities in the short term, but after three years quality of care for some fell significantly below levels
predicted from pre-incentive trends
Improvements associated with financial incentives seem to have been achieved at the expense of small detrimental
effects on aspects of care that were not incentivised
Tables
Table 1| Comparison of characteristics of general practices included in study and national practices (2006-7). Values are means (standard
deviations)
English practices (n=8226) Study practices (n=148) Characteristic
Patient characteristics
6478 (3967) 7117 (3441) Total number of patients
49.6 (2.8) 50.1 (1.7) Percentage female
Percentage by age (years):
43.2 (8.3) 41.3 (6.2) 15–44
24.3 (4.7) 25.6 (4.2) 45–64
15.0 (5.3) 15.8 (4.8) ≥65
Area characteristics
26.4 (17.5) 26.7 (18.0) Area deprivation*
Performance on Quality and Outcomes Framework indicators
89.7 (5.0) 90.8 (4.6) Overall reported achievement†
8.3 (2.8) 8.4 (2.9) Overall exception reporting rate‡
*Measured by the Index of Deprivation 2007.
†Mean of reported achievement rates for all clinical indicators. Reported achievement is the proportion of eligible patients for whom the indicators have been met,
excluding patients exception reported by the practice.
‡Mean of exception reporting rates for all clinical indicators. Practices are permitted to exclude (exception report) patients for whom the indicators are deemed
inappropriate (for example, because of terminal illness or a contraindication to an incentivised treatment).
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RESEARCHTable 2| Quality of care indicators analysed in study of 148 general practices to compare performance of activities incentivised in the QOF
scheme with activities not covered by the scheme
Period† Indicator
Study reference (QOF
reference*)
A) Incentivised measurement indicators
15 months Patients aged ≥20 with asthma whose notes record smoking status (except those who
have never smoked, when smoking status should be recorded at least once)
A1 (AST4)
15 months Patients with hypertension whose notes record smoking status (except those who have
never smoked, when smoking status need be recorded only once)
A2 (BP2)
9 months Patients with hypertension in whom there is a record of blood pressure A3 (BP4)
15 months Patients with coronary heart disease whose notes record smoking status (except those
who have never smoked, when smoking status need be recorded only once)
A4 (CHD3)
15 months Patients with coronary heart disease whose notes have a record of blood pressure A5 (CHD5)
15 months Patients with coronary heart disease whose notes have a record of total cholesterol A6 (CHD7)
15 months Patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in whom there is a record of smoking
status
A7 (COPD4)
15 months Patients with diabetes who have a record of HbA1c or equivalent A8 (DM5)
15 months Patients with diabetes who have a record of blood pressure A9 (DM11)
15 months Patients with diabetes who have a record of serum creatinine testing A10 (DM14)
15 months Patients with diabetes who have a record of total cholesterol A11 (DM16)
6 months Patients receiving lithium therapy with a record of lithium levels checked A12 (MH3)
15 months Patients receiving lithium therapy with a record of serum creatinine and TSH A13 (MH4)
15 months Patients with transient ischaemic attack or stroke whose notes record smoking status
(except those who have never smoked, when smoking status need be recorded only once)
A14 (STR3)
15 months Patients with transient ischaemic attack or stroke who have a record of blood pressure A15 (STR5)
15 months Patients with transient ischaemic attack or stroke who have a record of total cholesterol A16 (STR7)
15 months Patients with hypothyroidism with thyroid function tests recorded A17 (THY2)
B) Incentivised prescribing indicators
Current Patients with coronary heart disease who are treated with a β blocker (unless
contraindication or side effects recorded)
B1 (CHD10)
7 months‡ Patients with coronary heart disease who have a record of influenza immunisation B2 (CHD12)
Current Patients with coronary heart disease and left ventricular dysfunction who are treated with
ACE inhibitors (or A2 antagonists)
B3 (CHD/LVD3)
7 months‡ Patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease who have a record of influenza
immunisation
B4 (COPD8)
7 months‡ Patients with diabetes who have a record of influenza immunisation B5 (DM18)
7 months‡ Patients with transient ischaemic attack or stroke who have a record of influenza
immunisation
B6 (STR10)
C) Non-incentivised measurement indicators
5 years General population age 25–44 who have a record of blood pressure in their medical
records
C1
15 months Patients with peripheral arterial disease who have a record of total cholesterol C2
6 weeks Women aged >50 with depression who also have a record of thyroid function tests C3
6 weeks Patients with dementia who also have a record of thyroid function tests C4
5 years Patients with osteoarthritis who have a record of weight or body mass index C5
Since diagnosis Patients with coronary heart disease who have a record of blood sugar C6
Since diagnosis Patients with hypertension who have a record of blood glucose C7
Since diagnosis Patients with hypertension who have a record of total cholesterol C8
Since diagnosis Patients with hypertension who have a record of creatinine C9
D) Non-incentivised prescribing indicators
7 months‡ Patients with congestive heart disease who have a record of influenza immunisation D1
7 months‡ Patients with chronic renal disease who have a record of influenza immunisation D2
15 months Patients with asthma who have been issued with at least one prescription for a β blocker§ D3
12 months Patients with diabetes aged ≥65 treated with chlorpropamide or glibenclamide§ D4
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RESEARCHTable 2 (continued)
Period† Indicator
Study reference (QOF
reference*)
15 months Patients with osteoporosis treated with biphosphonates, selective oestrogen receptor
modulator, HRT, parathyroid hormone, or calcitonin
D5
15 months Patients with otitis media treated with oral decongestant§ D6
15 months Patients treated with sumatriptan who also have angina§ D7
15 months Patients with back pain treated with strong analgesics (co-dydramol upwards)§ D8
Same consultation Patients with upper respiratory tract infection, otitis media, cough, or bronchitis treated
with an antibiotic (excluding patients with diagnoses of chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease or cystic fibrosis)§
D9
5 years Patients who have had a splenectomy who have received pneumococcal vaccine D10
QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework, TSH=thyroid stimulating hormone, ACE= angiotensin converting enzyme, A2=angiotensin II, HRT=hormone replacement
therapy.
*Reference code used to identify indicator in the QOF.
†Period before financial year end (31 March) in which activity must have been performed.
‡For influenza immunisation indicators the activity must have been performed within the influenza season (1 September to 31 March).
§Reverse indicators—a lower proportion represents higher quality care.
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RESEARCHTable 3| Achievement rates for quality of care indicators among 148 general practices to compare performance of activities incentivised
in the QOF scheme with activities not covered by the scheme
Difference of actual from
projected (95% CI)§
Projected
achievement
rates‡
Actual achievement rates†
Indicator
(No of
eligible
patients)*
Post-intervention period
Preparatory
period
2003-4
Pre-intervention period
2006-7 2004-5 2006-7 2004-5 2006-7 2005-6 2004-5 2002-3 2001-2 2000-1
A) Incentivised measurement indicators
19.7 (18.0 to
21.3)
35.6 (33.9 to
37.1)
67.4 51.4 84.9 81.6 84.6 64.4 37.4 30.9 25.9 A1 (23 737)
14.0 (11.9 to
15.9)
30.1 (28.0 to
32.0)
70.8 53.0 81.4 74.6 80.8 62.9 36.8 29.9 24.0 A2 (60 466)
1.7 (1.3 to 2.0) 3.7 (3.2 to 4.2) 95.1 92.2 96.2 96.1 95.1 89.9 86.0 82.9 79.3 A3 (60 466)
0.7 (−0.9 to 2.1) 16.4 (14.9 to
17.7)
89.6 74.1 86.7 84.4 87.5 73.8 48.0 40.5 27.8 A4 (18 979)
0.5 (0.0 to 0.9) 3.1 (2.6 to 3.6) 96.5 93.1 96.0 95.6 95.2 90.3 84.7 80.0 73.9 A5 (18 979)
−2.1 (−3.2 to
−1.0)
5.8 (4.5 to 6.9) 93.2 83.2 89.1 88.2 86.6 74.4 62.2 53.3 41.0 A6 (18 979)
16.4 (15.7 to
17.1)
31.7 (30.9 to
32.4)
78.9 62.8 94.4 91.8 93.2 74.3 44.3 37.1 29.7 A7 (6 723)
−1.5 (−2.2 to
−0.9)
1.6 (1.0 to 2.2) 96.1 92.3 93.5 93.4 92.6 88.6 82.2 77.3 70.5 A8 (18 411)
−0.1 (−0.5 to 0.3) 1.6 (1.2 to 1.9) 97.1 94.8 96.2 96.0 95.6 92.7 88.4 85.4 81.6 A9 (18 411)
−2.1 (−2.7 to
−1.5)
2.7 (1.9 to 3.4) 97 90.6 93.8 93.6 92.0 85.2 70.8 61.9 51.8 A10 (18 411)
−2.5 (−3.2 to
−1.9)
2.0 (1.3 to 2.6) 96.3 90.7 92.8 92.7 91.5 84.6 75.5 66.7 57.2 A11 (18 411)
5.3 (3.5 to 7.0) 13.9 (11.7 to
16.0)
78.6 67.1 89.3 86.6 86.4 68.1 51.9 48.9 38.1 A12 (530)
6.9 (5.4 to 8.3) 21.1 (18.9 to
23.0)
79.4 63.5 95.7 94.2 89.3 69.9 41.8 34.7 23.4 A13 (530)
15.2 (13.3 to
16.9)
37.7 (36.1 to
39.1)
71 51.4 82.9 80.4 86.0 64.3 34.7 27.4 20.9 A14 (8 569)
2.6 (2.1 to 3.1) 6.8 (6.2 to 7.5) 93 88.1 94.7 94.5 93.7 85.6 78.3 73.0 68.0 A15 (8 569)
2.0 (0.8 to 3.1) 14.5 (12.7 to
16.1)
86.2 69.1 86.3 84.3 81.2 62.4 44.5 35.2 25.3 A16 (8 569)
−1.3 (−2.0 to
−0.7)
3.4 (2.6 to 4.0) 96.8 91.9 93.9 93.7 93.6 86.9 76.9 68.9 61.1 A17 (14 084)
B) Incentivised prescribing indicators
−2.0 (−3.5 to
−0.5)
2.0 (0.4 to 3.5) 58.6 51.9 56.0 54.9 53.5 49.1 45.0 42.5 39.2 B1 (15 490)
2.6 (1.4 to 3.8) 3.9 (2.7 to 5.1) 78.3 74.4 79.7 80.1 77.1 72.7 68.8 67.7 64.6 B2 (18 979)
−0.4 (−2.4 to 1.3) 1.2 (−0.9 to 3.1) 84.5 80.5 84.1 83.0 82.0 79.4 75.0 72.0 70.3 B3 (1 312)
10.4 (8.9 to 11.8) 8.3 (6.7 to 9.8) 73.7 73.7 82.1 82.6 80.3 75.5 71.7 71.4 71.7 B4 (6 723)
6.4 (4.9 to 7.8) 6.3 (5.0 to 7.7) 72.8 70.5 77.8 79.0 75.5 71.1 66.9 66.8 64.4 B5 (18 441)
3.2 (1.6 to 4.7) 3.8 (2.2 to 5.4) 74.9 71.6 76.8 76.6 74.2 69.5 66.8 66.4 63.3 B6 (8 569)
C) Non-incentivised measurement indicators
0.2 (−1.7 to 2.0) 1.5 (0.3 to 2.8) 72.2 68.4 72.3 71.4 69.8 66.9 63.9 61.3 59.9 C1 (120 802)
−9.5 (−13.7 to
−5.3)
1.6 (−2.8 to 6.1) 63.8 46.2 53.7 50.5 48.1 36.6 30.7 22.7 16.3 C2 (1 134)
−0.3 (−0.4 to
−0.1)
−0.1 (−0.2 to
0.1)
1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 C3 (14 722)
−6.4 (−8.6 to
−3.9)
−0.9 (−3.0 to
1.3)
23 18.4 19.4 15.6 19.0 18.3 13.8 9.4 7.9 C4 (1 643)
11.6 (9.0 to 13.9) 6.0 (3.6 to 8.4) 69.5 63.9 76.7 71.1 67.0 62.3 57.2 53.5 51.6 C5 (31 877)
−5.0 (−6.7 to
−3.6)
−1.3 (−3.5 to
0.7)
95.5 82.8 85.9 82.2 77.3 67.2 52.6 39.9 27.5 C6 (15 123)
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RESEARCHTable 3 (continued)
Difference of actual from
projected (95% CI)§
Projected
achievement
rates‡
Actual achievement rates†
Indicator
(No of
eligible
patients)*
Post-intervention period
Preparatory
period
2003-4
Pre-intervention period
2006-7 2004-5 2006-7 2004-5 2006-7 2005-6 2004-5 2002-3 2001-2 2000-1
−9.9 (−11.7 to
−8.1)
−3.3 (−5.6 to
−1.1)
91.4 74.2 78.4 73.8 67.7 58.6 46.0 34.8 25.4 C7 (50 085)
−2.1 (−3.6 to
−0.8)
1.4 (−0.3 to 3.0) 86.3 73 81.7 77.3 71.4 63.4 53.9 44.8 36.7 C8 (39 290)
−4.3 (−5.2 to
−3.5)
0.3 (−1.3 to 1.8) 95.9 83.5 89.8 86.2 80.9 71.1 55.2 44.4 33.2 C9 (49 999)
D) Non-incentivised prescribing indicators
−5.2 (8.9 to −1.8) −3.1 (−6.7 to
0.3)
75.3 72.4 69.8 69.7 66.9 68.0 67.0 67.4 64.0 D1 (1 109)
−1.9 (−7.1 to 3.1) 1.7 (−3.5 to 6.6) 63.7 60.7 67.0 69.1 62.9 66.7 60.5 59.4 56.4 D2 (5 622)
−0.08 (−0.3 to
0.2)
−0.1 (−0.3 to
0.1)
98.1 98.4 97.5 97.5 97.8 97.9 98.2 98.3 98.4 D3 (30 809)¶
−0.3 (−0.6 to
−0.2)
−0.3 (−0.5 to
−0.1)
98.7 97.8 98.1 97.5 96.7 95.8 94.6 93.1 90.9 D4 (9 479)¶
−12.8 (−14.9 to
−10.9)
−6.8 (−8.8 to
−4.7)
72.7 59.1 59.4 56.5 52.4 49.2 44.7 37.9 31.5 D5 (6 281)
−0.1 (−0.5 to 0.2) 0.2 (−0.1 to 0.5) 98 97.8 97.2 97.1 97.6 97.3 96.7 96.0 96.0 D6 (9 219)¶
0.3 (−0.3 to 0.8) −0.01 (−0.5 to
0.5)
93.6 93.5 98.5 98.4 98.6 98.4 98.7 98.1 98.7 D7 (1 513)¶
0.7 (−0.8 to 2.2) 1.3 (0.0 to 2.6) 56 57.2 56.7 57.5 58.2 58.3 57.9 58.9 58.9 D8 (26 764)¶
8.2 (6.1 to 10.3) 4.0 (2.4 to 5.7) 39.2 42.8 47.6 48.3 47.1 46.6 46.7 48.2 49.5 D9 (93 962)¶
−5.8 (−9.9 to
−1.3)
−3.8 (−6.9 to
−0.5)
33.3 31.6 26.9 30.1 26.4 26.9 28.9 25.4 26.8 D10 (509)
QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework.
*Based on 2006-7 data.
†Proportion of eligible patients across all 150 practices for whom the indicator was achieved. Periods 2000-1 to 2002-3 were before QOF came into force, 2003-4
when details of the forthcoming quality targets were known but incentives not yet available, and 2004-5 to 2006-7 were after QOF came into force.
‡Projected rate based on achievement trend 2000-1 to 2002-3.
§Values are derived from logit transformed data and may not equate to the difference between the observed rate and projected rate.
¶Reverse indicators, for which a lower proportion represents higher quality care. Reported rates given as (100–achievement rate). These reported rates, rather
than achievement rates, were used in the models.
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RESEARCHTable 4| Increase in achievement rates above projected rates for quality of care indicators among 148 general practices under the QOF
incentive scheme in year 1 (2004-5) and year 3 (2006-7) of scheme, and change in mean achievement rate between 2004-5 and 2006-7.
Comparison of performance of measurement and prescribing indicators incentivised under QOF against indicators not covered by the
scheme.* Values are means† (95% confidence interval) unless stated otherwise
Prescribing indicators Measurement indicators
P value of
difference§ Non-incentivised Incentivised
P value of
difference§ Non-incentivised Incentivised
Increase in mean
achievement above
projected trend†:
<0.001 −0.9 (−1.9 to 0.2) 4.3 (3.3 to 5.3) <0.001 0.3 (−0.8 to 1.3) 14.5 (14.0 to 15.0) Year 1 (2004-5)
<0.001 −1.7 (−2.7 to −0.0) 2.9 (2.0 to 3.7) <0.001 −5.6 (−6.6 to −4.6) 3.9 (3.2 to 4.5) Year 3 (2006-7)
0.002¶ 1.2 (0.6 to 2.0) 2.6 (1.8 to 3.3) <0.001 6.3 (5.7 to 6.8) 1.9 (1.4 to 2.5) Change in mean
achievement, 2004-5
to 2006-7
*Results are for model 1 (which controlled for differences in covariates across time points and practices within indicators). Results that differed for model 2 (which
controlled for differences in covariates between indicators) are indicated by ¶.
†Group means based on logit transformed data, back transformed to percentage scores.
‡Difference between observed achievement rate and rate projected from pre-incentive trend.
§Difference in increase/change between incentivised and non-incentivised indicators.
¶Not significant under model 2.
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RESEARCHFigure
Mean achievement rate of 148 general practices for quality of care indicators from 2000-1 to 2006-7. Performance indicators
grouped by activity and whether they were incentivised under the QOF scheme, which came into force from 2004-5. (The
mean rate is the mean of the adjusted means for the individual indicators within each group)
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RESEARCH